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Industrial Relations, Stratégie 
Importance, and Decision-Making 
Ricardo PECCEI 
and 
Malcolm WARNER 
This study looks at Industrial Relations decision-making in 
18 decision-areas, in a multinational firm. It analyses theproblem 
in terms ofa model of stratégie importance and examines in détail 
the inter-organizational variance of centralization of the Com-
pany's four main product divisions. Substructural autonomy ap-
pears to increase with the size ofsubsidiary, but seems to level off 
once they hâve attained a certain size. The average size of sub-
sidiary and average degree of conflict for each of the divisions 
were also found to be related in a somewhat unexpected way. 
Multi-national corporations (hitherto to be referred to as MNCs), hâve 
already been discussed by a number of writers, (see for example Warner & 
Peccei, 1977, Gunter, 1974; Levinson, 1972). A great deal has been written 
about the impact of multi-national firms on employment levels, wages, the 
structure of the labour force and related questions. By contrast, relatively 
little research has been done on the structure of decision-making in multi-
national companies with particular référence to industrial relations. This 
paper will concentrate on this neglected area of inquiry, and will relate an 
analysis of variance of decision-making, by product-division, to earlier fin-
dings, (see Peccei & Warner, 1976). 
What little évidence is available suggests that the handling of industrial 
relations matters (see Gennard & Steuer, 1971; Kujawa, 1971; Blake 1973; 
Roberts & May, 1974) in multi-national firms is 'apparently' far less cen-
tralised than is often claimed or feared. On the whole, labour-management 
relations 'appear' to be the responsibility of subsidiary management, with 
industrial relations issues usually not being decided at corporate head-
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quarters. Roberts and May do not offer a systematic explanation of the dif-
férent patterns of behaviour. They limit themselves to suggesting that, apart 
from cultural factors, the différences in the rôle of company headquarters 
in British and American firms may be due to: (1) différent policies of expan-
sion and patterns of ownership (2) différent degrees of financial control as 
well as différent methods and criteria for assessing performance (3) a dif-
férent tradition and expérience of collective bargaining resulting in a less 
highly developed sensé of company industrial relations policy in British 
than in American firms (1974: 407). 
Patterns of corporate behaviour, however, may vary over time (see for 
example Gill, 1974/5: 26). Warner et al. (1973) for example, hâve noted that 
multi-national firms, largely American although not necessarily, originally 
try to transfer their industrial relations style to other sites abroad in a 
wholesale fashion (stage A). They found (in stage B) later that they ran into 
trouble as the unions opposed certain 'alien' labour relations practices, and 
eventually (in stage ,C) moved to an accommodation grosso modo with the 
social-industrial norms dominant in the national culture. (1973: 20). What 
this first attempt at a development model suggested was that as multi-
national firms are pressured into adapting to the industrial relations prac-
tices of the host country, local management assumes greater responsibility 
for the handling of labour problems, and the extent of headquarters' inter-
férence tends to diminish. Even at this stage, however, the extent of cor-
porate intervention may fluctuate, increasing in times of crisis or when im-
portant issues are at stake and decreasing once the situation becomes nor-
malised. Thus, for example, as Ash (1967) points out, when it is deemed 
necessary the "corporate industrial relations department does get into the 
actions which are normally decentralised... for example, collective bargain-
ing is decentralised, but with detailed, continuous reporting of local bar-
gaining, the corporate department can and does step in (1) when the trend 
of the local bargaining may substantially affect more than one local unit; or 
(2) when unorganised units are organised for the first time; or (3) when 
management changes bring new, inexperienced management to the local 
bargaining table". (1967: 22). Or, more generally, as Gunter suggests, 
"headquarters management seems to interfère in the industrial relations 
policies of subsidiaries where the overall opérations of a corporation are en-
dangered". (1967: 42). 
In other words, the decision-making structure may be far from 'uni-
tary' or 'monolithic' in the sensé of being either wholly centralized or de-
centralized. As noted above the degree of headquarters involvement may 
also change over time as well as vary and fluctuate depending on the situa-
tion and on the nature of the issues. As Roig points out, "no structure of a 
multi-national company can be defined as simply unified or fragmented. 
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The equilibrium unification-fragmentation is dynamic and fluctuâtes in 
stabilising shifts, going forward in some aspects and withdrawing in others, 
in order to reach a new equilibrium from the disruption of the external 
forces faced by a multi-national company". (1967). In brief, therefore, the 
decision-making structure may be considerably more fragmented, fluid and 
complex than is often assumed or implied in the literature, (for a similar 
point based on slightly différent arguments see Gunter, 1974: 40), and af-
fect industrial relations of multi-plant firms in national as well as interna-
tional settings, (cf. Thomson & Hunter, 1975). 
One clue to a more profound understanding of the factors discussed 
above is to examine the objectives of the multi-national enterprise. One 
observer (Vernon, 1971) in discussing thèse objectives concèdes that the 
multi-national enterprises covered in his study are nearly identical with the 
largest US corporations, and that "ail generalizations on the subject of cor-
porate behaviour represent a heroic simplification of reality" (1971: 
115-116). He goes on to say that in the course of his study, "the simplifying 
model of the behaviour of large US corporations that has proved most 
useful is one quite far removed from the classical model'' (1971: 116). The 
characteristics he describes of oligopolistic compétition, uncertainty in the 
decision-making process, the "sheer size and diversity of thèse entities" 
(1971: 117), etc. lead him to conclude that thèse firms are différent from 
small businesses in their essential nature, and he concludes that they often 
give "the impression of a group of cooperating forces joined together in one 
organization but managing to retain distinguishably différent goals within 
it" (1971: 117). 
In order to weld together the various parts of this conglomeration to 
respond to problems in a way that is consistent with its collective goals, an 
organizational structure has to develop of a very spécial kind. The resuit, as 
described by Vernon, leads to a way of reaping the benefits of an interna-
tional division of activity but at the same time resolving the problem of in-
ternai control. How this supervision is maintained, given the size of such 
organizations, particularly in the industrial relations field, is the subject of 
this analysis. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
The study was carried out in a large, diversified, British-based interna-
tional company. The firm employs approximately 200,000 employées in 
seventy countries and has four main product divisions covering as many in-
dustries. The study covers ail four product divisions, but is coniïned in the 
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first instance to an examination of 21 United Kingdom subsidiaries of such 
divisions. After a séries of loosely structured interviews with top executives 
at Group and Division Headquarters a questionnaire was sent to each of the 
subsidiaries chosen for the study. The questionnaire was completed by the 
senior manager and/or the personnel director at the plant. The subsidiaries 
range in size from plants employing less than 50 employées to plants em-
ploying approximately 2,000 employées. In addition to the questionnaire, a 
séries of intensive interviews were conducted with senior managers and per-
sonnel directors at three UK plants in the South East of England. 
CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS — DEFINITION OF TERMS: 
CENTRALIZATION, DECENTRALIZATION, AUTONOMY 
The centralization-decentralization variable has been conceptualized 
and measured in a number of différent ways in the literature on organiza-
tions. Thus, for example, it has been treated both as a dichotomous variable 
and as a continuum. It has been measured in terms of relatively objective 
criteria, such as the ratio of corporate IR staff to total IR staff, as well as in 
terms of the degree of délégation and of hierarchical participation in 
decision-making. (See, for example, Hall, 1962; Ash, 1967; Pugh et al, 
1968; Blau, 1971; and Warner et ai, 1973). In this paper, centralization and 
decentralization will be related to the concept of substructural autonomy. 
In brief, centralization and decentralization may be thought of as compris-
ing opposite ends of a continuum. This continuum is in turn composed of 
two main dimensions or variables: the degree and the scope of autonomy of 
substructural units. Thèse two variables may vary independently and taken 
together they define the degree of centralization or decentralization of an 
organization with respect to IR decision-making. 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE MEASURES 
Degree of Autonomy 
This may be measured by two questions. One refers to the degree to 
which headquarters is involved in policy-making: the other to the degree of 
influence which subsidiary management has at the local level and to the 
degree of effective control which it has in the handling of IR issues. 
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Scope of Autonomy 
This may be measured in terms of autonomy over 18 décision areas. In 
rjrevious studies (Kujawa, 1971; Blake, 1973; Roberts & May, 1974) only 
five gênerai catégories of IR functions are identified. Ash, (1967) provides a 
more detailed list of 19 IR activities. A few of the activity areas identified by 
Ash are included in the présent list. Some of his items, however, are far too 
gênerai (e.g. union collective bargaining), while others are not particularly 
relevant to the présent research (e.g. "executive health program", "em-
ployée communications'' and so on). Thomson and Hunter, (1975) hâve 
pursued another approach related to the centralization of collective bar-
gaining. The présent list of IR décisions was compiled with two main 
criteria in mind: (1) that the décisions refer to areas or issues which are of 
particular relevance to trade unions, and/or blue and white-collar em-
ployées. On the basis of this criterion, décisions concerning the establish-
ment and administration of an "executive health program", for example, 
are considered of only marginal interest and are consequently excluded 
from the list. (2) That the décision area be as spécifie as possible. General 
items such as collective bargaining and contract interprétation, therefore, 
were excluded in favour of a more detailed breakdown of activities in terms 
of spécifie issues and décisions. In addition we included overall décisions 
broader than IR, e.g. those relating to capital investment at plant level. 
EXPLANATORY MODEL AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
There are a larger number of both organizational and environmental 
factors which may affect the degree of autonomy of a substructural unit 
within large organizations (see also Gennard and Steuer, 1971; Roig, 1971; 
Warner & Turner, 1972; and Gunter, 1974, for spécial référence to multi-
national firms). Before listing some of the main factors, it may be useful to 
suggest an initial explanatory model of substructural autonomy. This model 
should help to clarify the relationship between the independent and the 
dépendant variables. 
To the extent that headquarters fears that local management may make 
incorrect décisions, or to the extent that décisions made at the point of pro-
duction are likely to hâve major conséquences for overall company perfor-
mance, top management is not likely to relinquish control over the decision-
making process (see Blau, 1970: 171), in order to maintain consistency 
across plants say in wage levels. However, it may not always be possible for 
the headquarters to maintain a highly centralized system of decision-
making. The influence of factors like technology, or the environment may 
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not permit it. There may well be costs and burdens associated with a high 
degree of centralization, which, together with local pressures for greater 
autonomy, may constrain top management to decentralize decision-
making, both in reality, or even appearance. 
What we are assuming is that there is a strong tendency for head-
quarters to centralize décisions. This tendency, however, will be reversed 
when centralization becomes either impossible or impractical (where they 
hâve little opinion) and when top management feels that it is relatively safe 
to delegate décisions. This may also vary over time (Gill, 1974/5: 26). The 
independent variables which will be identified below, therefore, are essen-
tially those factors which either increase or reduce the risk of decentraliza-
tion, and which make it either necessary or désirable for headquarters to 
grant greater freedom of action to subsidiary management across the board, 
or even selectively. 
Certain factors, such as size of plant, may be hypothesized as exerting 
conflicting pressures on the degree of local autonomy. Thus, for example, it 
may be argued that headquarters are more likely to become involved in the 
IR problems of large plants because of their strategic importance to the 
company as a whole. On the other hand, large strategic units may become 
an independent power base, thus enabling local managers at thèse plants to 
gain a high degree of influence and autonomy. Similarly, when attempting 
to identify the combination of factors associated with a high degree of 
decentralization it is necessary to keep in mind that some highly inter-
correlated factors may hâve opposite effects on autonomy, thus cancelling 
each other out. 
MEASURES OF CENTRALIZATION-DECENTRALIZATION 
In the présent study the degree of centralization-decentralization is 
measured in terms of 18 spécifie IR activities or decision-areas. (See Table 
1). In addition, two main dimensions of centralization-decentralization are 
distinguished: 
Policy Decentralization 
Refers to the relative involvement of local management and Head Of-
fice in the formulation of IR policies and guidelines. Measured in terms of a 
5 point scale (see Table 2): 1 = High policy decentralization (complète local 
management autonomy in policy formulation); 5 = High policy centraliza-
tion (complète Head Office control over formulation of IR policies). 
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De Facto Decentralization 
Refers to the degree of influence which, in practice, local management 
has over IR matters at plant level. Measured in terms of a 5 point scale (see 
Table 2): 1 = High de facto decentralization (in practice local management 
has complète say over IR matters); 5 = Low de facto decentralization (in 
practice local management has no say over IR matters). 
For each decision-area, therefore, local management was asked to 
specify their degree of involvement in policy formulation and to assess their 
degree of effective influence over the décision. For each décision a summary 
index of centralization-decentralization was then constructed by combining 
the scores on thèse two dimensions. 
Overall Decentralization — Score on Variable (1) + Score on Variable (2) 
Measured on a 5 point scale, 1 = High overall decentralization, 5 = 
High overall centralization. In order to assess the nature of the relationship 
between local management and Head Office, for each of the 18 décisions 
respondents were also asked to specify whether or not the issue tends to be a 
contentious one, i.e. whether or not it générâtes conflict and disagreement 
between Head Office and local management. 
Level on Conflict Between Head Office and Local Management 
Dichotomous variables — 0 = No disagreement, 1 = Disagreement. 
TABLE 1 
List of IR Décisions 
1 Recruitment of employées 
2 Transfer of employées within or between departments or work groups 
3 Payment Systems for employées within the plant 
4 Employées' wages and salaries in excess of those established in national agreements 
5 Dismissal of employées 
6 Restructuring and reorganisation of work tasks 
7 Redundancies and lay-offs within the plant 
8 Disciplinary measures (warnings, fines, suspensions, etc.) 
9 Appointment of shop-floor supervisors 
10 Overtime work 
11 Safety measures 
12 Capital investments at plant (purchasing of new machinery, etc.) 
13 Job évaluation (work study techniques, time and motion studies, etc.) 
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14 Employées' holidays (those aspects which are not already covered by national agree-
ments, e.g. timing and possibly duration of holidays) 
15 Appointment of senior manager(s) at plant 
16 Organisational change (création of new departments, introduction of new specialist rôles, 
etc.) 
17 Employées' effective working time (those aspects not already covered by national agree-
ments, e.g. length of lunch and tea breaks, number and timing of rest periods per day, 
etc.) 
18 Sélection of middle managers at plant 
STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE AND UNCERTAINTY 
Inter-plant variations in the degree of autonomy shall be analyzed 
primarily in terms of the strategic importance of the units and of the degree 
of uncertainty faced by management at the local level, (see Peccei and 
Warner, 1976). 
The degree of uncertainty or unpredictability at the local level is direct-
ly related to the variable encompassing the 'need to decentralize'. It seems 
reasonable to assume that as the degree of uncertainty increases at the 
periphery of an organization so does the need to decentralize authority since 
it becomes increasingly difficult for the centre to effectively cope with ail 
the unexpected problems which are likely to arise at the local level. Head-
quarter's dependence on subsidiary management in turn strengthens the 
bargaining position of the periphery vis-à-vis the centre, thus further rein-
forcing the tendency towards local autonomy: see for example, Crozier 
(1964) on control of uncertainty as a basis of power. Other things being 
equal, therefore, one would expect there to be a positive corrélation be-
tween the degree of local uncertainty and the degree of substructural 
autonomy. 
The relation between autonomy and the strategic importance of sub-
structural units, by contrast, is more complex. In terms of the gênerai model 
suggested above, the strategic importance of a substructural unit can be said 
to affect the degree of autonomy through its effect on the 'risk of decen-
tralization' variable. From the point of view of headquarters the greater the 
strategic importance of a unit, the greater the risks involved in decentraliza-
tion. Headquarters are more likely to become involved in decision-making 
processes of strategic plants because of the greater impact which thèse units 
hâve on the functioning and success of the company as a whole. In princi-
pe , therefore, one might expect to find a négative relationship between the 
degree of local autonomy and the strategic importance of substructural 
units. Strategic units, however, may become dépendent power-bases in their 
own right. Through control over valued resources, local management at 
thèse plants can gain a certain degree of autonomy vis-à-vis headquarters. 
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The stratégie importance variable, therefore, may be hypothesized as exer-
ting possibly conflicting pressure on local autonomy. On balance, however, 
one would expect the négative relationship to be stronger so that, in gênerai, 
one would argue that the greater the stratégie importance of a substructural 
unit, the lower its degree of autonomy. 
Schematically, thèse various relationships may be represented as 
follows (in Figure 1): 
FIGURE 1 
The model 
Relatiye 'pover' of 
^•^sunsidiary management ~* - ^  
Stratégie Importance p. Risk of Decentralization 
of unit -A 
Degree of 
substructural 
autonomy 
Degree of local • Need to décentralize 
uncert^inty 
'Relative 'power' of 
suBsidiary management 
SIZE OF UNIT AND AUTONOMY 
A positive association was found between size and degree of autonomy 
of subsidiaries (Pearson r = 0.58, significant at 0.05 level). The larger the 
size of a unit, the greater its autonomy vis-à-vis headquarters. This relation-
ship holds true also if we control for uncertainty. Thus, we find a positive 
partial corrélation of 0.44 between size and autonomy controlling for the 
level of conflict between management and unions, (see Peccei and Warner, 
1976). 
This discrepancy between the original theory and the empirical évi-
dence is in need of discussion. In the first place, it should be emphasized 
that the findings are based only on a moderately sized and possibly idiosyn-
cratic sample. The lack of empirical support for the original hypothesis, 
therefore, does not necessarily mean that it can be rejected outright. To 
meaningfully test this hypothesis, in fact, one would require évidence from 
a much larger and more représentative sample or organizations than the one 
used in the présent research. 
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Nor, for that matter, can one rule out the possibility that lack of sup-
port for the original hypothesis is due to the nature of the data and/or 
measures employed rather than to weaknesses in the theory as such. The 
reliability of data obtained by means of a postal questionnaire is, at least to 
some extent, open to question. So is the validity of constructing an overall 
autonomy score for each of the subsidiaries aggregating and averaging 
responses over the set of eighteen décisions. A summary index of autonomy 
is obviously necessary and désirable. Ideally, though, in constructing such 
an index one should take into account différences in the type, frequency and 
objective or subjective importance of décisions. In practive, however, it 
proved impossible to weight the eighteen décisions in terms of thèse various 
criteria. The average score used in the présent analysis, therefore, is not 
totally satisfactory and its value as a gênerai index of autonomy is open to 
question. 
Yet a further factor which might account for the unexpected nature of 
the présent findings is the fact that our analysis focuses on size of unit, 
while ignoring other possible indicators of strategic importance. As noted 
above, the strategic importance of a unit is a function of a number of fac-
tors which need not necessarily be inter-correlated. By concentrating on 
only one of the relevant variables, therefore, one is likely to obtain only a 
partial, and possibly a distorted, picture of the relationship between 
autonomy and strategic importance. This considération clearly applies in 
the présent case and might well help to explain why we failed to find em-
pirical support for the original hypothesis by using size of unit as the main 
independent variable. 
Given the possible limitations of our data and measures, were are not 
in a position to reject the original hypothesis with any degree of confidence. 
Nor, however, can it be fully accepted as formulated. Quite apart from the 
empirical-methodological problems considered above, the fact that a posi-
tive rather than a négative corrélation was found between size and 
autonomy, strongly suggests that the original theory is in need ofat least 
some modifications. 
In our theoretical discussion we stressed the fact that strategic impor-
tance may exert conflicting pressures on local autonomy since, not only the 
risk involved in decentralization but also the relative strength of local 
management, tends to increase along with the importance of a unit. In the 
original model we suggested that the risk factor was the most important élé-
ment in the situation and hypothesized a négative relationship between 
autonomy and strategic importance. This hypothesis was based on two 
assumptions. First, that in the case of strategic units, headquarters would 
attempt to minimize risks by retaining a high degree of control over 
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decision-making. And second, that this strain towards centralization would 
more than outweigh any centrifugal pressures resulting from increases in the 
relative strength of local management. The positive corrélation found be-
tween size and autonomy, however, suggests otherwise. It suggests that, at 
best, thèse assumptions are only of limited validity. In other words, the em-
pirical évidence points to the need to revise the original theory. 
Though statistically significant, the strength of this relationship should 
not be over-emphasized. Size, in fact, only accounts for approximately 34% 
of the variance in autonomy. The relative weakness of the relationship 
becomes even more apparent if we look at the corrélation between size and 
autonomy for each of the décisions separately rather than aggregating res-
ponses over the whole set of 18 décisions. 
With respect to indeed a majority of décisions (10 out of 18), the rela-
tionship between size and autonomy in fact seems to be characterized by a 
reverse *J' shaped curve. That is to say, autonomy is lowest in the case of 
the smaller subsidiaries and highest in the case of medium-sized units, with 
larger plants falling in between thèse two extrêmes. (See also Peccei and 
Warner, 1978). This pattern does not hold true for ail 18 décisions. Thus, 
for example, in a number of cases (décisions 3,8,9, 10, 12) we find a linear 
pattern, with autonomy increasing along with size of unit. In the case of 
thèse décisions, it is large rather than medium-sized plants which are the 
most autonomous. In other words, the relative position of médium and 
large units with respect to autonomy varies from one décision to the next. 
By contrast, we find little variation in the relative position of small plants; 
except in the case of a few décisions small plants are consiclerably less 
autonomous than either large or medium-sized units. 
Thus, over the whole set of décisions we find that on average, large 
subsidiaries tend to be marginally less autonomous than medium-sized 
ones, but that both thèse types of units are significantly more autonomous 
than small plants. From the data, therefore, it would appear that autonomy 
does, in fact, increase along with size of unit. After a certain point, how-
ever, the degree of autonomy tends to level off. If anything, in fact, there is 
a slight tendency for autonomy to décline as units become relatively large. 
A further important point which émerges from our data is that small, 
médium and large units also differ in terms of their pattern of centraliza-
tion. Décisions concerning capital investments, wages and payment Systems 
are among the most centralized irrespective of size of subsidiary. (Décisions 
12, 4 and 3). The position becomes increasingly complex if an analysis is 
made of inter-organizational variance, by product-division, as now follows. 
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BREAKDOWN BY PRODUCT DIVISION 
As can be seen in the Table 2, there are significant différences in the 
degree of centralization of the company's four main product divisions. 
TABLE 2 
Degree of Centralization of Four Divisions by Type of Décision 
Average Degree of Centralization 
Décision Division A Division B Division C Division D 
1 1.50 1.75 1.75 2.22 
2 1.00 1.25 1.25 1.66 
3 1.75 2.68 3.00 4.05 
4 2.00 2.43 3.00 3.77 
5 1.25 3.12 2.50 2.61 
6 1.00 1.56 2.50 1.77 
7 1.75 3.25 3.00 2.77 
8 1.00 2.58 4.50 2.72 
9 1.00 1.37 1.00 1.93 
10 1.25 1.87 2.25 2.16 
11 1.00 2.58 1.50 2.94 
12 2.25 2.87 2.75 4.22 
13 1.00 1.87 2.50 3.16 
14 1.25 1.62 1.00 2.00 
15 2.50 2.37 3.25 3.27 
16 1.75 2.06 2.75 3.88 
17 1.25 1.56 1.25 2.27 
18 1.00 1.75 2.25 2.05 
Average 
degree of 
Centrali-
zation 1.40 2.14 2.33 2.75 
(1 = low centralization; 5 = high centralization) 
Divisions A and B: différence between means significant at 0.001 level 
Divisions A and C: différence between means significant at 0.05 level 
Divisions A and D: différence between means significant at 0.001 level 
Divisions B and C: différence between means significant at 0.10 level 
Divisions B and D: différence between means significant at 0.001 level 
Divisions C and D: différence between means not significant 
Division A is by far the most decentralized. Local managers in this divi-
sion enjoy a fair degree of autonomy in the case of almost every décision; 
far more autonomy than do their counterparts in the other three divisions. 
At the opposite extrême is division D. On the whole, décisions tend to be 
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quite centralized in this division, so that, on average, subsidiary man-
agement enjoys a fairly low degree of autonomy in decision-making. 
A further important point which émerges from our data is that the four 
divisions also differ in terms of their patterns of centralization. As Table 3 
shows, décisions concerning capital investments and payment Systems are 
among two of the most centralized décisions in ail four divisions. 
TABLE 3 
Five Most Centralized Décisions by Division 
Rank Division A Division B Division C Division D 
1 15 1 15 12 
2 12 5 3, 4 & 7 3 
3 4 12 12 16 
4 3, 7 & 16 3 4 
5 8 & 11 3 
See Table 1 for the décision-types corresponding to thèse numbers. 
From Table 3, however, we can also see that the types of décisions 
which are most centralized do vary to some extent between divisions. The 
most significant finding in this respect is that divisions A and C share a 
broadly similar pattern of centralization which in turn differs from that of 
the other two divisions. Thus, in divisions A and C, unlike in the other two 
divisions, headquarters exercises the greatest degree of control over the ap-
pointment of senior managers. 
At the same time, there is also an emphasis on capital investments and 
on more traditional IR questions such as wage-rates, payment-systems and 
redundancies. Questions concerning payment-systems and wages are also 
among the most centralized décisions in division D, along with décisions 
about job-evaluation and organizational change. In this case, however, it is 
décisions concerning capital investments which are the most centralized. 
Finally, division B exhibits yet a différent pattern of centralization. In this 
division, in fact, there is a much greater emphasis on the centralization of 
IR issues as such. In this case, moreover, the emphasis is on a slightly dif-
férent set of IR issues than in the other divisions (e.g. on décisions con-
cerning dismissals, disciplinary measures and safety-measures). 
Given the limited number of cases at our disposai ail we can do at this 
stage is suggest some tentative interprétations of the présent findings and 
explore some gênerai hypothèses which may serve as a point of departure 
for future research. 
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Earlier findings reported elsewhere (Peccei and Warner, 1976) suggest 
that the degree of autonomy of a subsidiary is related to its strategic impor-
tance (measured in terms of the total number of employées in the unit), and 
to the degree of uncertainty faced by local management (measured in terms 
of the frequency of union-management disagreement at the local level over 
the set of 18 décisions). The relationship between autonomy and each of 
thèse two variables was found to be of a non-linear nature. More specifi-
cally, autonomy increases along with size of subsidiary but tends to level off 
once units hâve attained a certain size. Similarly, autonomy at first in-
creases along with local uncertainty but tends to décline as the degree of 
uncertainty continues to grow. Of thèse two independent variables, size was 
found to be the most important in accounting for variations in the degree of 
local autonomy. 
In the présent case, we are not trying to account for variations in the 
degree of autonomy of subsidiaries as such. Rather, we are looking at varia-
tions in the overall degree of centralization of larger units (divisions), 
which, for présent purposes, can be conceptualized as separate multi-plant 
organizations in their own right, even though, in practive, they ail form part 
of a larger group or complex. In this case, therefore, the units of analysis 
are organizations (i.e. multi-plant divisions) rather than individual subsidi-
aries. Some of the hypothèses discussed in the earlier study, may neverthe-
less be generalized and prove useful in looking at inter-organizational (divi-
sional) variations in the structure of decision-making. 
It can be seen, in Table 4, that the relationship between the average size 
of subsidiaries and the average degree of union-management conflict for 
each of the four divisions under considération, is somewhat unexpected. 
TABLE 4 
Average Size of Subsidiaries & Average Degree of Local Conflict by Division 
Division A verage Size of Subsidiaries A verage Degree of Local Conflict 
A 850 0.68 
B 696 0.66 
C 1 380 0.79 
D 50 0.25 
On the basis of the previous research, we would expect the degree of 
centralization of a division to increase along with the average size of its sub-
sidiaries and along with the degree of union-management conflict which ex-
ists at the periphery of the organization. As the average size of subsidiaries 
and the degree of peripheral conflict continues to increase, however, we 
would expect this tendency to be reversed. In other words, we would expect 
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division A to be the most decentrahzed and division D to be the most cen-
tralized, with divisions B and C falling somewhere between thèse two ex-
trêmes. 
Figures 2 and 3 suggest that this is in fact the case. 
FIGURE 2 
Decentralization and Size 
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FIGURE 3 
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Our présent sample is clearly too small to enable us to systematically 
test out hypothèses. The fact that there is a fairly good fit between our 
hypothèses and the empirical findings, however, lends support to the 
gênerai model of centralization presented in the previous paper (Peccei & 
Warner, 1976) and suggests that this model may indeed prove useful in 
looking at both intra and inter-organizational variations in the structure of 
decision-making. 
What is particularly interesting in this connection is the fact that the 
présent findings seem to suggest that there is no direct relation between the 
degree of centralization of an organization and its overall size. In par-
ticular, and contrary to what has been recently suggested by a number of 
writers (e.g. Pugh et al., 1968; and Child, 1972), the degree of decentraliza-
tion does not seem to increase along with the overall size of the organiza-
tion. In the présent case, in fact, no clear pattern émerges in this respect. If 
anything, Figure 4 suggests that there is a négative rather than a positive 
relation between overall size of division and degree of decentralization. 
FIGURE 4 
Decentralization and Log Overall Size 
Eigh 
e 
o 
« 
N 
o 
4) 
(U 
U 
oo 
Lov 
Small (Log Overall Size) Large 
In other words, the overall size may not be a particularly significant 
variable in accounting for variations in the degree of centralization of 
organizations. This may be true particularly in the case of multi-plant 
organizations. In such cases, in fact, it may be far more important to look 
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at the internai structure of the organization, i.e. at the size and number of 
its constituent units, rather than at its overall size. As we hâve seen, in fact, 
large organizations with a large number of small subsidiaries (as in the case 
of division D may turn out to be far more centralized than smaller organiza-
tions with larger subsidiaries (as in the case of divisions A or C). 
CONCLUSIONS 
In so far as we hâve reviewed research findings in the field, and indeed 
carried out research ourselves in a large British-based MNC, (see Peccei and 
Warner, 1976), we hâve corne to the conclusion that certain decision-
making areas are explicitly centralized, for example, finance and the ap-
pointment of senior personnel. In addition several others may be apparently 
decentralized although there may well be a latent degree of control exercised 
and implicit in the very nature of decentralization and délégation, as we 
hâve discussed in the previous paper. When analyzed by product-division, 
the degree of decentralization does not increase with overall size. 
The research suggests that the degree of substructural autonomy of a 
unit is related to its stratégie importance (measured in terms of the total 
number of employées employed in the unit), and to the degree of uncertain-
ty faced by local management (measured in terms of the frequency of 
union-management disagreement at the local level over the set of 18 déci-
sions). More specifically, autonomy increases along with size of subsidiary 
but tends to level off once units hâve attained a certain size. Similarly, 
autonomy at first increases along with local uncertainty, but tends to 
décline as the degree of uncertainty continues to grow (Peccei & Warner, 
1976). Of thèse two independent variables, size was found to be the most 
important in accounting for variations in the degree of local autonomy, but 
not within product-divisions. 
The data collected (although limited in scale) however was highly sug-
gestive for possible dues to relationships. Ail we can do at this stage is sug-
gest some tentative interprétation of the présent findings and develop some 
exploratory hypothèses which may serve as a point of departure for more 
systematic future research. 
What the data relating to both the United Kingdom and Western Euro-
pean plants, taken together, seems to suggest is that, irrespective of the size 
and the degree of uncertainty faced by local management, foreign based 
subsidiaries tend to be significantly more autonomous than home based 
units in the field of IR (see Warner and Peccei, 1977; 1978). This in turn 
suggests that the 'home vs. foreign based' dimension is central to the analy-
sis of sub-structural autonomy, and that the degree and pattern of centrali-
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zation in multi-national firms is likely to differ from that in multi-plant 
organizations which only operate within national boundaries. Their rela-
tionship to the market environment in which they operate may be of some 
relevance hère, but not necessarily conclusive. We can only suggest that this 
is a difficult field in which to generalize. 
Even if it can be demonstrated that considérable managerial autonomy 
exists at the country and/or plant level, and indeed that the acceptance of 
worker-participation structures there constitutes further decentralization, it 
nonetheless remains likely that the parameters of policy are set at the very 
highest level in the MNC's structures, especially in the key areas we hâve 
discussed. (See Warner and Peccei, 1977; 1978). Although such attempts at 
worker participation may be very often a source of irritation to the MNC 
and indeed worse still perceived as potentially very subversive, in reality 
such countervailing power may be very circumscribed. On the other hand, 
decision-making is more complex and fragmented than many observers 
believe. 
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Prise de décision et relations industrielles 
dans les multinationales 
Les multinationales ont déjà fait l'objet de maintes études (Warner et Peccei), 
1977; Gunter, 1974; Levinson, 1972). On a beaucoup écrit au sujet de l'influence de 
ces firmes sur les niveaux d'emploi, les salaires, la structure de la main-d'oeuvre et 
autres questions connexes. Au contraire, on a effectué peu de recherches touchant le 
processus de prise de décision dans les sociétés multinationales en ce qui concerne les 
relations de travail. Cet article porte essentiellement sur cet aspect négligé du com-
portement des multinationales et il se rapporte à une analyse des différences dans le 
processus de prise de décision selon les divisions de produits qu'on y fabrique en 
regard de recherches antérieures (Peccei et Warner, 1976). 
L'étude a été effectuée dans une grande société multinationale à l'activité diver-
sifiée dont le siège social est situé en Grande-Bretagne. La société emploie 200 000 
personnes réparties dans soixante-dix pays et elle est active dans la fabrication de 
quatre types de produits s'étendant à autant d'industries, mais elle porte en premier 
lieu sur vingt et une filiales de ces divisions au Royaume-Uni. Après une série d'inter-
views d'un caractère informel avec les cadres supérieurs au siège social et au bureau 
principal des divisions, on fit parvenir un questionnaire à chacune des filiales choisies 
pour l'étude. Le questionnaire fut rempli par le gérant ou le directeur du personnel 
de l'établissement. Quant à leur importance, les filiales s'étendent d'établissements 
comptant moins de 50 employés jusqu'à des établissements qui en comprennent 
2 000. Outre le questionnaire, une série d'interviews approfondies eurent lieu avec 
les cadres supérieurs et les directeurs du personnel dans trois établissements du sud-
est de l'Angleterre. 
En autant que nous avons révisé les résultats des découvertes dans ce domaine et 
effectivement poursuivi nous-mêmes des recherches dans une grande multinationale 
britannique (Peccei et Warner, 1976), nous sommes arrivés à la conclusion que, dans 
certains services, la prise de décision est nettement centralisée, par exemple, pour les 
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services de finances et la nomination du personnel supérieur. Par ailleurs, plusieurs 
autres services peuvent paraître décentralisés en apparence, bien qu'il puisse exister 
un certain degré latent de contrôle lequel est implicite dans la nature même de la 
décentralisation et de la délégation de pouvoirs, comme nous l'avons noté dans un 
article antérieur. Lorsqu'il est analysé, en tenant compte des divisions, le degré de 
décentralisation n'augmente pas avec les dimensions de la firme. 
Les résultats de la recherche permettent de conclure que le degré d'autonomie 
sous-jacent d'une unité est relié à son importance stratégique (mesurée selon le nom-
bre total des employés de l'unité) et au degré d'insécurité que la direction locale doit 
affronter (mesuré selon la fréquence des désaccords entre le syndicat et la direction 
au niveau local sur un ensemble de dix-huit décisions). D'une façon plus spécifique, 
l'autonomie s'accroît d'après l'importance de la filiale mais tend à s'amenuiser une 
fois que les unités ont atteint une certaine dimension. De même, l'autonomie 
s'accroît d'abord avec l'insécurité locale, mais tend à décliner quand le degré d'insé-
curité continue à croître. (Peccei et Warner, 1976). De ces deux variables indépen-
dantes, la dimension de l'établissement ressort comme la plus importante pour expli-
quer les variations dans le degré d'autonomie locale, mais non à l'intérieur des 
divisions. 
Les données recueillies (bien qu'elles soient d'une étendue limitée) étaient cepen-
dant très révélatrices de l'indication des rapports. Tout ce qu'il est possible de faire à 
ce stade, c'est d'avancer une certaine interprétation sujette à révision des découvertes 
actuelles et de soumettre quelques hypothèses exploratoires qui peuvent servir de 
point de départ à des recherches futures plus systématiques. 
Ce que les données relatives aux établissements du Royaume-Uni et de l'Europe 
de l'Ouest, considérées ensemble, semblent indiquer, c'est que, indépendamment du 
degré d'insécurité que la direction locale doit affronter, les filiales établies à l'étran-
ger ont tendance à être autonomes d'une façon plus marquée que les unités natio-
nales. Ceci, en retour, indique que l'élément «unités nationales comparées aux unités 
étrangères» constitue le point central en ce qui concerne l'autonomie sous-jacente et 
que le degré et le modèle de centralisation dans les sociétés multinationales est sus-
ceptible de différer de ceux qu'on découvre dans les entreprises à établissements 
multiples qui sont exploitées à l'intérieur des frontières nationales. Leurs relations 
avec le marché ambiant au sein duquel elles fonctionnent peuvent être d'une certaine 
pertinence ici, mais elles ne sont pas nécessairement concluantes. Qu'il suffise de 
suggérer qu'il s'agit d'un domaine difficile où il n'est guère possible de généraliser. 
